The starting point with this is to understand the difference between the fund and the fund manager. The fund (also known as “Collective Investment Scheme”) itself is a separate legal entity- and there would normally be little reason for someone to set the fund up in the UK unless the investors were here.

There are numerous issues affecting which jurisdiction a fund should be domiciled in- who the investors are, is it a regulated fund or unregulated fund, tax etc. etc. Now is probably not the place for a lesson in how funds work- but if you need a contact to assist, the client decide the domicile for the fund and how to set it up then 1 can provide contacts for some very good guys. Cayman and the Caribbean is popular for hedge funds, Guernsey and Jersey for property, Ireland and Luxembourg (and now Malta) for UCITS funds etc.

However, the entity that must be regulated is the investment manager i.e. the company with a mandate from the fund to manage its investments for it. This is a “moderately complex” FSA application- i.e. one step down from a bank and a step up from a normal broker or dealer; it’s a big deal in the FSA’s eyes.

Typically this will be a BIPRU 50k firm (see the license options)- so minimum regulatory capital is Euro50k- but always remember, for investment firms this is not the exact capital. The exact capital is calculated on a risk analysis of the firm (using the ICAAP process)- but typically you can approximate it as the higher ofEuro50k and 25% of annual fixed costs. We would give exact guidance on this.

Problems in the Middle East have been a source of oil-price spikes, which in turn have caused three of the last five international recessions. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 triggered a large increase in oil prices, leading to the international stagflation of 1974-1975. The Iranian revolution in 1979 led to a similar stagflation increase in oil prices, which have ended in the recession of 1980-1981. And Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to increase in oil prices at a time when a US banking crisis was already turning America into recession.
Political changes in the Middle East has powerful financial and economic implications, particularly as it increases the risk of stagflation, a serious combination of largely rising inflation and slowing growth. In fact, should stagflation emerge, there is a serious risk of a double-dip recession for a international economy that has barely emerged from its worst crisis in many years.
Oil prices as well played a role in the current finance-driven international recession. Right before the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the summer of 2008, , oil prices had doubled over the previous 12 months, reaching a peak of $148 a barrel – and delivering the coup de grâce to an already frail and struggling global economy buffeted by financial shocks.
Even before the current Middle East political turmoil, oil prices had risen above $80-$90 a barrel, an increase driven not only by energy-hungry emerging-market economies, but also by non-fundamental factors: a wall of liquidity chasing assets and commodities in emerging markets, owing to near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing in advanced economies; limited and inelastic oil supplies momentum and herding behaviour. If the threat of supply disruptions spreads beyond Libya, even the mere risk of lower output may hardly increase the “fear premium” via precautionary stockpiling of oil by investors and final users.
Nobody knows yet whether political problem in the Middle East will spread to other countries. The turmoil may yet be contained and recede; sending oil prices back to lower levels. But there is a serious chance that the uprisings will spread, destabilizing Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Algeria, Yemen, and eventually even Saudi Arabia.

François Baroin French Budget Minister has confirmed the government’s intention to present two possible ideas for wealth tax (l’impôt de solidarité sur la fortune – ISF) reform in France to a colloquium, due to be held at the finance ministry on March 3.

Baroin revealed that the difference between the two scenarios is concerning the future of wealth tax. The first option, he explained, involves radically transforming the tax, while the second “maybe” involves completely abolishing it in its current form.

Following months of intensive speculation and deliberation, Budget Minister Baroin has finally confirmed that both proposals provide for the suppression of the country’s highly controversial tax shield mechanism (bouclier fiscal), limiting direct taxes in France (wealth tax, income tax, and local taxes such as dwelling and real estate tax) to 50% of income, including social contributions.

Many UMP party members have repeatedly warned of the difficulties associated with financing the reform, and of the political risks associated with removing the tax on the country’s wealthiest individuals. Yet President Sarkozy remains undeterred, convinced that a small reform would merely serve to accentuate problem areas.

While the fate of the tax shield mechanism is now beyond doubt, the fate of the ISF tax appears to remain very much in the balance, and is still being discussed even within the ranks of the French President’s own deeply divided Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party.

Wealth tax that was created in 1989, is progressively applied on wealth in excess of EUR790,000. Paid by more than 560,000 households in France, the tax is expected to generate in the region of EUR3.9bn for the state this year. Accused by some of leading to an exodus from France of the wealthiest, the tax is extolled by others for its fiscal justice.

Pointing on wealth, taxation and European integration, the colloquium, which is due to be presided by French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde and Budget Minister François Baroin is designed to gather together economists, parliamentarians,  and business leaders for an overview of wealth in France and an insight into international practice.

The best blog directory on Blogs

There is also support from recent relevant research on the push effects of firms‟ limited or stagnating domestic market on internationalization behavior. For example, both Rundh and Orser and colleagues found this to be the case based on their respective studies of Swedish and Canadian firms. A regional, or sub-national, dimension was reported by Lopez, who found that Spanish firms from different regions differed significantly in their export tendency, with export propensity increasing in regions with less favorable domestic conditions, local incentives to export and good export infrastructure. The Spanish study also identified the favorable country/region of origin image enjoyed by Spanish agricultural products in international markets as an additional stimulus for the internationalization of the firms investigated. Recent evidence from Chile and Indonesia further suggests a greater tendency to export among firms from sectors characterized by high levels of export intensity and presence of foreign buyers. The Indonesian finding on the importance of foreign buyers‟ presence is significant as it reinforces the earlier observed need to boost SMEs‟ role in global value chains through facilitating their integration into production/supply systems of foreign affiliates of larger firms (OECD, 2008).